Critical Infrastructure System Security and Resiliency by Betty E Biringer

By Betty E Biringer

''Part l: defense hazard evaluation. bankruptcy 1. advent to protection threat review As our kingdom strikes ahead within the age of knowledge and worldwide economic climate, our dependencies on nationwide infrastructure is larger than ever. Compromise of our severe infrastructures might disrupt the features of our executive, enterprise, and our lifestyle. Catastrophic losses when it comes to human casualties, estate destruction, Read more...

Show description

Read or Download Critical Infrastructure System Security and Resiliency PDF

Similar security books

La sécurité dans la maison (L'artisan de sa maison)

Assurer l. a. sécurité de son habitation est à l. a. portée de tous mais, grâce à ce petit livre pratique, on ne se laissera plus décourager par l. a. variété ou l. a. complexité des matériels disponibles. Qu'il s'agisse de remplacer une serrure ou d'installer un système de vidéosurveillance on saura quoi faire et remark.

Security in Computing and Communications: International Symposium, SSCC 2013, Mysore, India, August 22-24, 2013. Proceedings

This publication constitutes the refereed court cases of the foreign Symposium on safety in Computing and Communications, SSCC 2013, held in Mysore, India, in August 2013. The 24 revised complete papers awarded including 15 poster papers have been conscientiously reviewed and chosen from 111 submissions. The papers disguise all facets of safe computing and verbal exchange in networking and allotted platforms comparable to cloud-based info facilities.

Additional info for Critical Infrastructure System Security and Resiliency

Sample text

2 Fault tree development for impair/­ cause loss of substation 2— transfer 1. Electric Reliability Council 2004). Further development suggests that loss of substations can be caused by (1) impairing or causing loss of substation 1 or (2) impairing or causing loss of substation 2; the diamond shape below the event for substation 1 denotes that this particular event will not be developed further at this time. The transfer symbol below Impair or Cause Loss of Substation 2 notes that logic development labeled with a 1 will be developed elsewhere and/­or the logic may be repeated elsewhere in the tree.

Several types 14 Critical Infrastructure System Security and Resiliency of primary events may be applicable to fault tree development for undesired events. The BASIC EVENT symbol indicates an initiating fault requiring no further development. The symbol for the BASIC EVENT is a circle. The UNDEVELOPED EVENT symbol indicates an event that is not further developed either because it is of insufficient consequence, because information is not available, or because it has not been developed yet. The symbol for the UNDEVELOPED EVENT is a diamond shape.

Department of Homeland Security 2010). S. Department of Homeland Security 2010) identified 18 critical infrastructure sectors and a designated federal sector-­specific agency to lead protection and resilience-­building programs and activities. The sectors include the following: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Agriculture and Food Banking and Finance Chemical Commercial Facilities Communications Critical Manufacturing Dams Defense Industrial Base Emergency Services Energy Government Facilities Healthcare and Public Health Information Technology National Monuments and Icons Nuclear Reactors Postal and Shipping Transportation Systems Water 3 4 Critical Infrastructure System Security and Resiliency Of significance are the dependencies among the infrastructures that could result in cascading effects if one or more infrastructures are degraded.

Download PDF sample

Rated 4.77 of 5 – based on 47 votes